

## Eishin Yamaguchi

1 A. I do not recall accurately.  
 2 Q. Well, do you recall anything at all about the  
 3 conversation in that regard?  
 4 A. I recall that we had the conversation, but I  
 5 do not recall the words that were spoken.  
 6 Q. Now, there's an area mike or microphones in  
 7 the cockpit, and those conversations would have been  
 8 recorded by the cockpit voice recorder; correct?  
 9 A. I have never heard it.  
 10 Q. That's not the question, Mr. Yamaguchi. The  
 11 question is would those discussions -- you were under  
 12 power, and therefore the cockpit voice recorder was  
 13 working at the time you had those discussions in the  
 14 cockpit; correct?  
 15 A. Yes.  
 16 Q. And so whatever was said by yourself or your  
 17 two fellow pilots, as far as you know would be recorded  
 18 on the cockpit voice recorder; correct?  
 19 A. I don't know. I've never heard it.  
 20 Q. Was the discussion in English or Japanese?  
 21 A. Japanese.  
 22 Q. Now, let's say, did you at any point ever turn  
 23 off the cockpit voice recorder while you were taxiing  
 24 prior to the impact?  
 25 A. No.

Page 82

1 and the captain of a 777 in San Francisco with 155 or  
 2 more people. I want you to assume that you, during that  
 3 taxi, see a United aircraft and you perceive that  
 4 could -- you don't know for sure -- but you perceive  
 5 that could be a collision hazard.  
 6 Do you understand my question to this point so  
 7 far, sir?  
 8 MR. TURNER: So far there's no question.  
 9 Objection as to form and foundation.  
 10 THE WITNESS: Are you asking me to assume?  
 11 MR. TORPEY: Q. Mr. Yamaguchi, I think, with  
 12 all due respect, my question was clear. I've only asked  
 13 you whether you understood my question to this point.  
 14 Do you understand my question to this point,  
 15 sir? That's the only thing I've asked you.  
 16 A. I don't know what question you are referring  
 17 to.  
 18 Q. Mr. Yamaguchi, we'll try another question  
 19 since apparently you won't answer that one.  
 20 MR. TURNER: There's no reason for those kind  
 21 of snide comments.  
 22 MR. TORPEY: I think the question was direct,  
 23 and I don't think it was answered, with all due respect  
 24 to Mr. Yamaguchi. And I will try another question  
 25 because apparently that's the thing to do at this point.

Page 84

1 Q. Now, you indicated you don't know what you  
 2 thought should be done back on October 7, 2003. So I  
 3 want to ask you, let's assume that today, okay, that  
 4 today you're taxiing at San Francisco Airport and  
 5 exactly the same situation presents itself to you as it  
 6 did on October 7 of 2003.  
 7 When you perceive a potential conflict or  
 8 collision hazard with the United aircraft, what do you  
 9 believe you should do at that point?  
 10 MR. TURNER: Objection as to form and  
 11 foundation, incomplete hypothetical and a misstatement  
 12 of this witness's prior testimony.  
 13 MR. TORPEY: Q. Go ahead.  
 14 A. In the first half of your question you stated,  
 15 quote, you indicated that you do not know what should be  
 16 done or what should have been done on October 7, 2003,  
 17 close quote.  
 18 I have never made such a statement.  
 19 MR. TORPEY: Q. Well, you indicated you don't  
 20 recall what you thought you should do.  
 21 MR. TURNER: Objection as to form and  
 22 foundation, misstatement of this witness's prior  
 23 testimony, and you're just arguing with the witness.  
 24 MR. TORPEY: Q. Mr. Yamaguchi, I want you to  
 25 assume that you, right this moment, are pilot in command

Page 83

1 Q. I'm asking you, sir, whether today when faced  
 2 with a potential collision hazard at San Francisco  
 3 airport what it is you, as the pilot in command, are  
 4 required to do? That's the question.  
 5 A. And naturally if I believe there will be a  
 6 collision, I will stop. But if I judge that there's no  
 7 potential for a collision, then I will continue to taxi.  
 8 Q. Now, if you're not sure whether or not you're  
 9 going to make it or clear, do you agree in that  
 10 situation that you should stop until you know, in fact,  
 11 you're not going to collide?  
 12 A. If there's a potential for a collision, then  
 13 naturally we will stop.  
 14 Q. And was that the understanding you had of what  
 15 you should do back on October 7 of 2003 as well?  
 16 A. When you ask me is that the understanding,  
 17 what understanding are you talking about?  
 18 Q. In response to two questions, you just told me  
 19 what you believed you should do today if faced with a  
 20 collision hazard. My question is would that be the same  
 21 answer that would apply back in October 7 of 2003, if  
 22 faced with the same situation I presented in my  
 23 hypothetical today?  
 24 MR. TURNER: Objection as to form and  
 25 foundation.

Page 85

22 (Pages 82 to 85)

## Eishin Yamaguchi

1 THE WITNESS: Do you wish to inquire if we  
 2 should have stopped? Is that what you are trying to  
 3 ask?

4 MR. TORPEY: Q. Mr. Yamaguchi, do you agree  
 5 with me, sir, that if on October 7, 2003, you or any  
 6 member of your flight crew felt that you were going to  
 7 collide with the United aircraft, that it was incumbent  
 8 upon you to stop your aircraft? Do you agree with that?

9 A. If we had felt that there would be a  
 10 collision, then naturally we would have stopped, but we  
 11 did not think so. That is why we continued taxiing.

12 Q. Now, Mr. Yamaguchi, if on October 7, 2003, you  
 13 didn't know for sure whether or not you might collide  
 14 with the United aircraft, would you agree with me that  
 15 you should stop until you know for sure whether or not  
 16 you were going to collide with the United aircraft?

17 MR. TURNER: Objection to form and foundation.

18 THE WITNESS: I do not agree.

19 MR. TORPEY: Q. So even if you don't know  
 20 whether or not you're going to collide with the United  
 21 aircraft, you feel it's okay to continue taxiing until  
 22 you know for sure you're going to hit it?

23 MR. TURNER: Objection as to form and  
 24 foundation and a misstatement of this witness's prior  
 25 testimony.

Page 86

1 Q. So you believe that if United intruded into  
 2 the taxiing pathway, even if you have come to the  
 3 determination that you're not sure whether or not you  
 4 can clear the United aircraft, you are not obligated to  
 5 stop?

6 MR. TURNER: Objection as to form and  
 7 foundation and a misrepresentation of this witness's  
 8 prior testimony.

9 THE WITNESS: I have been repeatedly saying  
 10 that if we had judged that there was a possibility or  
 11 potential for a collision, we would have stopped. But  
 12 at that time our judgment that -- was that there was no  
 13 such possibility, therefore, we continued taxiing.

14 MR. TORPEY: Q. You've said that repeatedly,  
 15 Mr. Yamaguchi, and I'm not asking you about that, so you  
 16 don't have to tell me that yet another time.

17 I'm asking you now to switch to another  
 18 situation, that is if on October 7, 2003, you did not  
 19 know for sure -- and I'll repeat it -- you did not know  
 20 for sure that you would clear the United aircraft, in  
 21 that situation, Mr. Yamaguchi, you were required to  
 22 bring your aircraft to a stop until you knew for sure  
 23 that you would clear that conflict. True or false, sir?

24 MR. TURNER: Objection as to form and  
 25 foundation and incomplete hypothetical.

Page 88

1 THE WITNESS: I would like the question again.  
 2 That is not so.

3 MR. TORPEY: Q. All right. So what you're  
 4 saying, Mr. Yamaguchi, is that if you're taxiing and you  
 5 don't know for sure whether or not you're going to clear  
 6 the conflict or the other aircraft, then until you do  
 7 know for sure that you can clear, you should stop.

8 Is that what you're saying?

9 MR. TURNER: Objection as to form and  
 10 foundation and a misrepresentation of this witness's  
 11 prior testimony.

12 THE WITNESS: Talking in generalities, that  
 13 would be the case.

14 MR. TORPEY: Q. Okay. And if on October 7,  
 15 2003, you or a member of your flight crew was uncertain  
 16 whether or not your aircraft, if it continued to taxi,  
 17 would be able to do so without hitting the United  
 18 aircraft, then the correct thing to do would have been  
 19 to stop the taxi until you could determine that you  
 20 would be able to avoid hitting it; correct?

21 A. That is not so.

22 Q. Well, then explain why that's not so.

23 A. There's another interpretation that is  
 24 possible and that is that the United aircraft intruded  
 25 into the path of our taxiing pathway.

Page 87

1 THE WITNESS: There seems to be a difference  
 2 in our mutual understanding of the situation. I judged  
 3 that the situation was clear, therefore, I continued  
 4 taxiing, but you are working on the premise that that  
 5 was not possible.

6 MR. TORPEY: Q. Mr. Yamaguchi, I'm going to  
 7 move to strike your answer as nonresponsive, and I'm  
 8 going to ask you one final time, and I'm not going to  
 9 ask it again. I'll take the matter up at another  
 10 time if need be.

11 MR. TURNER: I object to your comments to this  
 12 witness.

13 MR. TORPEY: Q. You've told us repeatedly  
 14 that you believe that you could clear. I am not asking  
 15 you about that. I'll let you translate that.

16 One last time, Mr. Yamaguchi, I want you to  
 17 assume -- I want you to assume that on October 7, 2003,  
 18 while your aircraft with 155 passengers was taxiing  
 19 under your command and you saw the United aircraft and  
 20 perceived a potential collision hazard, do you agree,  
 21 Mr. Yamaguchi, that you were obligated to stop if you  
 22 did not know whether or not you were going to clear, if  
 23 you did not know -- and I'll repeat -- if you did not  
 24 know you would clear, you were obligated to stop;  
 25 correct?

Page 89

23 (Pages 86 to 89)

## Eishin Yamaguchi

1 MR. TURNER: Objection as to form, foundation,  
2 incomplete hypothetical.

3 THE WITNESS: I am afraid my answer is the  
4 same. I did not believe that there would be a  
5 collision. I judged that it was possible to taxi.

6 MR. TORPEY: All right. I'd ask the reporter  
7 to mark that last two sequences of question and answer.  
8 We need to have that portion of the transcript if we  
9 need to go back to that.

10 I will move to strike, but again, I will take  
11 that up at another time. I'm not going to argue with  
12 the witness, and I'm not going to ask any further  
13 questions. I have a number of follow-ups. That's a  
14 critical issue, and I'm not going to go further in light  
15 of the fact that the witness is being unresponsive.

16 MR. TURNER: I disagree with your comments and  
17 believe the witness is answering your questions as best  
18 he can. It's the questions that leave a lot to be  
19 desired. It's up to you whether you want to continue on  
20 this line or not.

21 MR. TORPEY: Well, I've said what I have to  
22 say.

23 Q. Mr. Yamaguchi, I'm going to ask you something  
24 different. You indicated that you thought that your  
25 aircraft would clear and therefore you continued to taxi

1 I thought you were going to be able to clear, and based on  
2 that discussion, is it your understanding that the other  
3 two agreed with you that there was a 100 percent  
4 certainty that you would clear the United aircraft and  
5 therefore did not have to stop?

6 MR. TURNER: Objection as to form and  
7 foundation. Just being repetitious and arguing with  
8 this witness, but if you want to waste your time like  
9 that, it's fine with me.

10 THE WITNESS: I am repeating myself, but I do  
11 not have an accurate understanding of what other people  
12 were thinking.

13 MR. TORPEY: Q. If hypothetically the flying  
14 pilot, your copilot or the observer pilot had indicated  
15 to you as the pilot in command that they're not certain  
16 whether or not your aircraft was going to clear the  
17 United aircraft, would you have continued to taxi, or  
18 would you have ordered the aircraft to stop?

19 MR. TURNER: Objection as to form and  
20 foundation and incomplete hypothetical.

21 THE WITNESS: If I can go back to four years  
22 ago, perhaps I can give you an answer, but I cannot say  
23 what was the thought, stopping or continuing.

24 MR. TORPEY: Again, I'll move to strike as  
25 nonresponsive.

Page 90

Page 92

1 as opposed to stopping. Is that your position in this  
2 case, sir?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Now, up until the actual moment when your  
5 aircraft impacted the United aircraft, are you  
6 testifying here under oath that you believed that your  
7 aircraft was not going to hit the United aircraft, you  
8 were a hundred percent certain up until the moment of  
9 impact that you were not going to hit that United  
10 aircraft? Is that your testimony?

11 MR. TURNER: Objection as to form and  
12 foundation.

13 THE WITNESS: Yes.

14 MR. TORPEY: Q. And is it your understanding  
15 your first officer and the observer pilot were also 100  
16 percent certain up to the moment of impact that there  
17 was not going to be a collision between the United  
18 aircraft and your aircraft?

19 MR. TURNER: Objection as to form and  
20 foundation.

21 THE WITNESS: They are other people, so I do  
22 not know. But I was the PIC, so I rendered the ultimate  
23 decision.

24 MR. TORPEY: Q. Well, but you also discussed  
25 in Japanese with the other two whether or not you

1 Q. Mr. Yamaguchi, that wasn't my question. I  
2 didn't ask you what you were thinking back then. I  
3 asked you if your first officer or your observer pilot  
4 had expressed to you concern to the effect that they  
5 were not sure whether or not -- whether or not -- your  
6 aircraft was going to clear.

7 If, hypothetically, they had said that to you,  
8 as the pilot in command, you were obligated to bring  
9 your aircraft to a stop until you knew whether or not  
10 you were going to collide with the United aircraft?

11 MR. TURNER: Objection as to form and  
12 foundation and incomplete hypothetical.

13 THE WITNESS: If there had been such a  
14 statement, then I would have considered that statement.  
15 But I do not know if we would have stopped or not. I'd  
16 like to take a break at an appropriate time.

17 MR. TURNER: Good idea. This is an  
18 appropriate time. We've been going for an hour and a  
19 half since lunch.

20 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Going off the record. The  
21 time on the monitor is 3:33 p.m.

22 (Recess taken.)

23 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Coming back on the record.  
24 The time on the monitor is 3:47 p.m. Please begin.

25 MR. TORPEY: Q. Mr. Yamaguchi, we were

Page 91

Page 93

24 (Pages 90 to 93)

## Eishin Yamaguchi

1 talking before the break about the fact that you were  
 2 certain that you were not going to collide with United  
 3 aircraft, and that's why you did not order the aircraft  
 4 stopped prior to impact.

5 What did you or others in your flight crew do  
 6 to determine and come to the conclusion that you were  
 7 definitely not going to hit the United aircraft?

8 A. First of all --

9 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter will  
 10 restate.

11 THE WITNESS: First of all, from the cockpit  
 12 we saw that there was sufficient clearance or distance  
 13 and we had received the clearance to taxi and was  
 14 taxiing according to instructions. But from a certain  
 15 point in time it is no longer possible to see the rear  
 16 of the aircraft, therefore, from that point on, it is  
 17 not possible to judge what the opposing aircraft did.

18 MR. TORPEY: Q. All right. Let me ask you.  
 19 Mr. Yamaguchi, what you're saying is at some point in  
 20 time you can't see the tip of your right wing tip as you  
 21 continue to taxi towards the United aircraft; correct?

22 A. The wing tip cannot be seen from the cockpit.

23 Q. And it was the wing tip --

24 A. In a way.

25 Q. I'm sorry. The right wing tip of your

Page 94

1 Q. If you open the window on the right-hand side,  
 2 you'd be able to see the tip of the right wing, correct,  
 3 if you stick your head out and look?

4 A. The potential for a collision wasn't that  
 5 imminent, therefore, that was not done. But even if  
 6 that window was opened and someone had looked out, it  
 7 would be difficult to gauge the distance between the  
 8 wing tip of our aircraft and the wing tip of the  
 9 opposing aircraft.

10 MR. TORPEY: And I'll move to strike.

11 Q. The question, Mr. Yamaguchi, is if you looked  
 12 out the window, opened the window, put your head out and  
 13 looked out the window, you can see the wing tip on the  
 14 right-hand side of your aircraft. True statement, sir?

15 A. The answer is the same. Since that was not  
 16 necessary, it was not done.

17 Q. I didn't ask you that, Mr. Yamaguchi. Once  
 18 again, I'll move to strike, and for the last time I'll  
 19 ask you this question.

20 If you want to see the right wing tip of your  
 21 aircraft while you're sitting at the gate and you open  
 22 that right-hand window and stick your head out, you can  
 23 see the right wing tip of your aircraft, that 777  
 24 aircraft; correct?

25 A. That may be possible, but that is not a usual

Page 95

1 aircraft is what collided with the United aircraft;  
 2 correct?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. And, in fact, even if you had looked out from  
 5 the first officer's position or your position or the  
 6 observer's position, even at the gate, you would still  
 7 not be able to see the wing tip of your aircraft;  
 8 correct?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. So during the entire time you're taxiing from  
 11 the gate to the impact, the portion of your aircraft  
 12 that struck the United aircraft, was never visible to  
 13 you, the flying pilot or the observer pilot.

14 True statement?

15 A. You mean our wing tip?

16 MR. TORPEY: Read back the question, please.  
 17 (Record read by the reporter.)

18 THE WITNESS: Yes.

19 MR. TORPEY: Q. Now, there's a window on the  
 20 right-hand side of the cockpit that opens; correct?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Did anyone that day prior to the impact open  
 23 the window and try to look out to see the wing tip  
 24 before the impact?

25 A. No.

Page 95

1 procedure.

2 Q. So you agree with me that if you wanted to  
 3 stick your head out the window as you were taxiing on  
 4 October 7, 2003, to see your right wing tip, you could  
 5 have done that, and you would have seen the right wing  
 6 tip; correct?

7 A. In such a situation at that time it was not  
 8 necessary to open the window and see the right wing tip,  
 9 and, actually, it should not be done because naturally  
 10 our aircraft would come to a stop, and it would not be  
 11 necessary.

12 Q. Are you testifying you have to stop the  
 13 aircraft to open that right window?

14 A. Ordinarily the aircraft would be stopped.

15 Q. Not asking you ordinarily, Mr. Yamaguchi. I'm  
 16 asking you whether you are testifying that in order to  
 17 physically open the right wing -- excuse me -- the right  
 18 window of your aircraft, that the aircraft must be at a  
 19 stop or you are unable to physically open that window?  
 20 Is that your testimony, sir?

21 A. That is not so.

22 Q. If you wanted to open the window -- I'm not  
 23 asking you whether you think you should. I'm asking you  
 24 if you wanted to open the window or have your flying  
 25 pilot open the window on October 7 of 2003, look out the

Page 97

25 (Pages 94 to 97)

## Eishin Yamaguchi

1 window and see the wing tip to determine if there would  
 2 be clearance between your aircraft and the United  
 3 aircraft, you could have done that; correct? That's the  
 4 only question. You could have done that; correct?

5 MR. TURNER: Objection to form and foundation.  
 6 And I would like the question read back.

7 (Record read by the reporter.)

8 THE WITNESS: I do not know if we could have,  
 9 but it was not necessary to do so. In fact, the United  
 10 aircraft people did not open that aircraft's window  
 11 either.

12 MR. TORPEY: Q. I'll move on to another.  
 13 question, Mr. Yamaguchi. I'm not going to continue to  
 14 ask you the same thing and get the same answer, so let  
 15 me ask you this.

16 If, in fact, as you've testified you can't see  
 17 the right wing tip of your aircraft, then there is  
 18 absolutely no way you or your flying pilot or your  
 19 observer pilot can know for certain whether or not the  
 20 right wing tip is going to collide with the United  
 21 aircraft because you can't see it within the cockpit.

22 True statement?

23 A. The judgment of the --

24 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter will  
 25 restate. The interpreter has to confirm one word.

Page 98

1 MR. TORPEY: Q. And what if you couldn't make  
 2 a determination either way? Would you stop or would you  
 3 just drive up your driveway and see if you run over the  
 4 glass?

5 MR. TURNER: Objection as to form and  
 6 foundation and incomplete hypothetical.

7 THE WITNESS: Naturally, if I am in a  
 8 quandary, I would stop.

9 MR. TORPEY: Q. And let me ask you this,  
 10 Mr. Yamaguchi. If you or others in the cockpit cannot  
 11 see the wing tip of your aircraft as you're taxiing  
 12 towards the United Airlines on October 7, 2003, then  
 13 there's a portion of your aircraft that potentially is a  
 14 conflict hazard that you cannot rule out simply by  
 15 looking out the cockpit windows; correct?

16 A. That is a structural issue. As long as one  
 17 operates a vehicle of that structure, it cannot be  
 18 helped.

19 Q. I'm not asking you, Mr. Yamaguchi, if it can  
 20 be helped. I'm asking you once again, that since you  
 21 cannot see the right wing tip of your aircraft, it is  
 22 not possible -- it is impossible for you to see whether  
 23 or not your wing tip is going to clear the United  
 24 aircraft simply by looking out the windows in the  
 25 cockpit.

Page 100

1 THE WITNESS: The space or distance was judged  
 2 before the collision took place. It is just like  
 3 someone who is driving a car from his left seat he  
 4 cannot see the front right wheel of his car when he's  
 5 driving.

6 MR. TORPEY: Q. Well, if there was an object  
 7 in front of the front right wheel of your car, and you  
 8 didn't know -- let's put it this way.

9 Let's say you're driving a car. Let's say  
 10 you're just driving into a driveway in your house and  
 11 let's say there's a bunch of nails in your driveway or  
 12 maybe some glass.

13 And let's say that you pull in but you can't  
 14 really see your right front tire so you don't know if  
 15 you are going to run it over and get a flat.

16 Would you keep going until you see if you can  
 17 make it, or would you stop, get out of the car and try  
 18 to determine whether your tire was going to run over  
 19 it?

20 What would you do, sir?

21 MR. TURNER: Object as to form and foundation.

22 THE WITNESS: That would depend on the  
 23 situation. If I judge that it is dangerous, then I  
 24 would stop and remove them. But if I judge that I can  
 25 pass by, I would do so.

Page 99

1 Is that a true statement or false statement?  
 2 That's the question. Just say true or say false.  
 3 That's the question.

4 MR. TURNER: Objection as to form and  
 5 foundation and the witness is instructed to give the  
 6 appropriate answer that he believes is responsive.

7 MR. TORPEY: No. The witness is to answer  
 8 true or false. That's the question. You aren't to  
 9 instruct your witness to answer other than a way I've  
 10 asked the question.

11 MR. TURNER: You are not to instruct the  
 12 witness how to answer the question.

13 MR. TORPEY: Well, I'm not going to argue with  
 14 you, Marshall. If you want to instruct him not to  
 15 answer that question, you do so and you have a reason  
 16 for doing so if you do. But I've asked a question.  
 17 I've asked this witness whether he thinks it's a true  
 18 statement or a false statement. That's the only  
 19 question.

20 Now if you want to follow up and ask questions  
 21 additionally when you have a chance to do it, you can do  
 22 it.

23 Q. But right now, sir, all I want to know is what  
 24 I said to you is that a true statement or a false  
 25 statement? That's the question.

Page 101

26 (Pages 98 to 101)

## Eishin Yamaguchi

1 MR. TURNER: The witness can give what he  
2 believes is an appropriate responsive answer.

3 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter will repeat  
4 the question in Japanese.

5 THE WITNESS: We can see the right wing tip of  
6 the UA aircraft from its location. We can judge if  
7 there is sufficient clearance.

8 MR. TORPEY: I'll move to strike the answer.

9 That wasn't the question, and the witness did not give a  
10 true or false statement, so I'm going to move to strike.

11 Q. I'm going to move on to something else because  
12 apparently I cannot ask you with regard to that question  
13 any further questions until we have a ruling on that.

14 Now, Mr. Yamaguchi, after the impact, what did  
15 you and your other crew members do?

16 A. We confirmed that there was no fuel leakage.

17 Q. How did you do that?

18 A. The observer pilot looked in the window at the  
19 right.

20 Q. Did he open the window?

21 A. No.

22 Q. Did you or the observer pilot or the flying  
23 pilot of this aircraft get out and look around the  
24 ground area where the collision occurred?

25 A. No.

Page 102

1 Stayed on it, and ultimately it was tugged back to the  
2 gate and that's where you got off. You walked directly  
3 into the jetway again?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Now, when you impacted the United aircraft,  
6 did your aircraft come virtually immediately to a stop?

7 A. Our aircraft did stop, but we don't know if it  
8 is due to the impact or due to the braking by the flying  
9 pilot.

10 Q. Okay. Did he apply brakes immediately upon  
11 impact?

12 A. That I do not know.

13 Q. Did you do anything in terms of braking or  
14 physically manipulating any of the controls at any time  
15 on or after the impact?

16 A. No. I did not apply the brakes nor did I  
17 manipulate any control.

18 MR. TORPEY: Now, let me show you -- let's  
19 mark this as the next exhibit. In fact, the next two  
20 exhibits.

21 (Whereupon, Exhibits 3 and 4 were marked for  
22 identification.)

23 MR. TORPEY: Q. Have you had a chance,  
24 Mr. Yamaguchi, to look at Exhibits 3 and 4, those being  
25 airport operations bulletins of July 31, 2000, and

Page 104

1 Q. So other than looking out the window by the  
2 observer pilot to see whether there was any fuel  
3 leaking, did you or the other members of your crew take  
4 any other action other than simply leaving the airplane  
5 and going directly into the terminal?

6 A. We received a report from the cabin.

7 Q. Who, and what was that report?

8 A. I don't recall who.

9 Q. From a flight attendant.

10 THE WITNESS (WITHOUT INTERPRETER): Yes.

11 MR. TORPEY: Q. And what did the flight  
12 attendant say, if you recall?

13 A. The flight attendant reported that there was  
14 nothing unusual in the cabin and the attendant reported  
15 that there was no injury. He or she then inquired what  
16 happened.

17 Q. And how were you all taken off the aircraft?

18 Did you go out a back stairway on to a bus, or was your  
19 aircraft pulled back to the gate. How was it that you  
20 ultimately got off the aircraft, you and the other crew  
21 members?

22 A. The aircraft was tugged and pulled back to the  
23 gate.

24 Q. So you never left -- you or your other crew  
25 members never got off the airplane, after the impact?

Page 103

1 August 7, 2001?

2 A. No.

3 Q. Have you ever seen those before?

4 A. No.

5 Q. Were you aware -- let me have you look at  
6 Exhibit 3, for example. It says, to all airlines and  
7 aeronautical support tenants.

8 On July 31, 2000, All Nippon Airways was  
9 flying aircrafts into San Francisco Airport; correct?

10 THE INTERPRETER: May I have the question,  
11 please.

12 MR. TORPEY: Let me ask you to mark this --  
13 why don't you mark this as exhibit whatever is next, 5,  
14 I guess.

15 MR. WORTHE: 5.

16 (Whereupon, Exhibit 5 was marked for  
17 identification.)

18 MR. TORPEY: Q. Mr. Yamaguchi, you can see  
19 that is -- let me represent to you that is a satellite  
20 photograph of the terminal and ramp area at  
21 San Francisco Airport that includes the area where the  
22 taxi and impact occurred.

23 You'll see that there are designated areas for  
24 nonmovement area and others that are called movement  
25 areas. Are you familiar with what a movement area is

Page 105

27 (Pages 102 to 105)

## Eishin Yamaguchi

1 versus a nonmovement area?  
 2 A. Yes.  
 3 Q. What is the difference or the distinction  
 4 between what would be considered the movement area and  
 5 the nonmovement area in Exhibit 5?  
 6 A. Nonmovement area is under the jurisdiction of  
 7 the ramp control, whereas the movement area is under the  
 8 jurisdiction of ground control.  
 9 Q. And ramp control is United ramp control in  
 10 this area; correct?  
 11 A. I don't know if it is United or not, but it is  
 12 called a ramp control.  
 13 Q. And the movement area is not under the control  
 14 of ramp control; correct?  
 15 A. Ordinarily that is so, but this particular  
 16 area is one where there is an overlap, so I don't know  
 17 what the true situation of the operation is.  
 18 Q. As a pilot for ANA are you saying that you do  
 19 not know the distinction at San Francisco International  
 20 Airport with regard to who has jurisdiction over the  
 21 movement versus the nonmovement area?  
 22 A. There's a guideline on the chart, but there is  
 23 no way that I would be able to know how the ramp control  
 24 and ground control actually operate.  
 25 Q. In order to taxi your aircraft onto any

Page 106

1 Q. And if you look at definitions, it describes --  
 2 what a movement area is and a nonmovement area. Do you  
 3 see that?  
 4 A. Yes.  
 5 Q. And then under that there's something called  
 6 reporting point.  
 7 A. Yes.  
 8 Q. And it says numeric pavement marking located  
 9 on a taxiway that indicates a transition area from a  
 10 nonmovement to a movement area, and it includes  
 11 number 1, 2, 10, and 11. You see that?  
 12 A. Yes.  
 13 Q. Now, are you familiar with the reporting area  
 14 known as spot 10 at San Francisco Airport?  
 15 A. Yes.  
 16 Q. And is it your understanding that spot 10 --  
 17 in fact, if you look at Exhibit 5, that recon photo 1,  
 18 do you see that designation for spot 10 where the arrow  
 19 is pointing?  
 20 A. Yes.  
 21 Q. And do you understand that that's the  
 22 reporting point or the transition point between the  
 23 nonmovement to the movement area?  
 24 A. Yes.  
 25 Q. Do you know why spot 10 is called a reporting

Page 108

1 portion of a movement area at San Francisco, you have to  
 2 contact the Federal Aviation Administration, ATC ground  
 3 control; isn't that true?  
 4 A. I would like the question again, please.  
 5 Q. In order to taxi into any portion of a  
 6 movement area, you must get clearance from air traffic  
 7 control ground control; correct?  
 8 A. That's right.  
 9 Q. And you cannot get permission from ramp  
 10 control to go into a movement area; correct?  
 11 A. Yes.  
 12 Q. Now, the ground control, that is the Federal  
 13 Aviation Administration that are the ground controllers;  
 14 is that correct?  
 15 A. I do not know if it is under the jurisdiction  
 16 of the FAA, but the ground control controls the movement  
 17 area.  
 18 Q. Okay. Let me have you look back at Exhibits 3  
 19 and 4, which were airport operations bulletins issued on  
 20 the dates indicated to all airlines which would include  
 21 ANA, and it looks -- under background -- in fact, if you  
 22 turn to the next page under procedures --  
 23 MR. TURNER: Are you referring to 3 or 4?  
 24 MR. TORPEY: Let's look at Exhibit 3 first.  
 25 And I guess let's start under definitions.

Page 107

1 point?  
 2 A. That I did not know.  
 3 Q. If you look at the next line, procedures, it  
 4 says here, aircraft -- strike that:  
 5 The second paragraph under procedures, it says  
 6 here, unless otherwise directed, outbound taxiing  
 7 aircraft shall stop at respective reporting point prior  
 8 to contacting SFO air traffic control terminal for  
 9 further taxi instructions. Do you see that?  
 10 A. Yes.  
 11 Q. On October 7, 2003, were you aware of that  
 12 requirement?  
 13 A. Yes.  
 14 Q. And how is it that you became aware of that  
 15 requirement on October 7, 2003, prior to that impact?  
 16 A. It is written on the route manual.  
 17 Q. All right. This is the manual that goes with  
 18 the aircraft; correct?  
 19 A. It is the manual that each individual has.  
 20 Q. And as the pilot in command or the flying  
 21 pilot, both you and your copilot were required to know  
 22 and follow that instruction; correct?  
 23 A. Yes.  
 24 Q. And if you turn the page again to the third  
 25 page of Exhibit 3, it states here that all airlines are

Page 109

28 (Pages 106 to 109)

## Eishin Yamaguchi

1 required to closely monitor and follow the clearances  
 2 provided by these towers as well as those of FAA, ATC  
 3 upon reaching reporting points which included spot 10.

4 Do you see that?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And do you know what, if anything, ANA was  
 7 doing at any time prior to October 7, 2003, to monitor  
 8 or enforce the requirements to comply with those  
 9 clearances as that bulletin direction?

10 A. There was nothing that was special but the  
 11 same thing is included in the route manual.

12 Q. Okay. And I apologize if I asked you this  
 13 before. The route manual would be carried on the  
 14 aircraft you were taxiing the day of this accident;  
 15 correct?

16 A. Yes.

17 MR. TORPEY: Let's mark this as Exhibit 6.  
 18 (Whereupon, Exhibit 6 was marked for  
 19 identification.)

20 MR. TORPEY: Q. I'll represent to you,  
 21 Mr. Yamaguchi, that that was a partial transcript  
 22 prepared by ANA submitted to the NTSB as parts of its  
 23 investigation package with regard to their investigation  
 24 into the circumstance in this matter.

25 Have you ever seen that partial transcript

Page 110

1 before?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And you understand that that is, in fact, a  
 4 partial transcript of the ANA cockpit voice recording  
 5 from the day of this accident?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. All right. Let's turn to where it says ramp  
 8 time. That's the middle column. Let's go down to  
 9 11:53:51 through 57.

10 There's communication from ramp tower to  
 11 yourself and that would literally -- you were the one  
 12 talking to the ramp tower that day; correct?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And the ramp tower responded to you by saying  
 15 Air Nippon 007, you are cleared to spot 10, please.

16 Have a good day. And then the very next line at  
 17 11:53:59, you personally would have responded to ramp  
 18 tower saying, cleared to spot 10. Have a good day.

19 MR. TURNER: I just want to state for the  
 20 record that in your reading you omitted a few words from  
 21 the first reading. At time 11:55:28 to 11:55:32.

22 MR. TORPEY: Q. Mr. Yamaguchi, you understood  
 23 that you were cleared only to go to, not beyond, spot 10  
 24 by ramp control; correct?

25 A. Yes.

Page 111

1 Q. And that would be consistent with -- strike  
 2 that.

3 In other words, until you've got clearance  
 4 from ground or air traffic control, no part of your  
 5 aircraft; not the tip, not any part of your aircraft can  
 6 enter the movement area until you get clearance from  
 7 ground; correct?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Now, let's look at the second page of  
 10 Exhibit 6, and if you look at the time reference of  
 11 11:54:54 through 57, once again, you personally are now  
 12 calling this time ATC ground control; correct?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And you asked at that point, you said you were  
 15 approaching spot 10 and you requested clearance to taxi,  
 16 in other words, to go now from spot 10 into the movement  
 17 area; correct?

18 MR. TURNER: Objection as to form and  
 19 foundation and a misstatement of this written  
 20 transcript.

21 MR. TORPEY: Q. Go ahead, Mr. Yamaguchi.

22 A. May I have the question once more.

23 MR. TORPEY: Read it back.

24 (Record read by the reporter.)

25 THE WITNESS: Yes.

Page 112

1 MR. TORPEY: Q. Okay. Now, in order for  
 2 you -- strike that.

3 If you go back to the first page of Exhibit 6,  
 4 after you asked ground -- strike that.

5 After you called the ramp tower, the United  
 6 ramp tower, and asked and understood you were cleared to  
 7 spot 10, that was the last time prior to impact you  
 8 attempted to contact United ramp control prior to the  
 9 impact; correct? You never again made an attempt to  
 10 contact United ramp control?

11 A. From this point to the point, time, is  
 12 11:56:29, I have not.

13 Q. So by 11:56:29, that's after the impact?

14 A. No. It's before the impact.

15 Q. I don't see here on Exhibit 6 where you tried  
 16 to contact ramp control after being cleared to spot 10.  
 17 Can you show me where you attempted to do that?

18 A. To ramp control did you say?

19 Q. Yes.

20 A. That record is not here, so up to this point  
 21 there has been no communication to ramp control.

22 Q. So is it fair to say then, Mr. Yamaguchi, that  
 23 once you received and understood you were cleared by  
 24 United ramp control to proceed to spot 10 that you did  
 25 not make any further attempts to contact ramp control

Page 113

29 (Pages 110 to 113)

## Eishin Yamaguchi

1 for any reason at any time prior to the impact?  
 2 A. Yes.  
 3 Q. Now, once you do at 11:54:54 contact ground,  
 4 that's ATC ground, to do that you had to switch your VHF  
 5 radio from the frequency that you use to talk to the  
 6 United ramp control to a different frequency in order to  
 7 contact ATC ground; correct?  
 8 A. Yes.  
 9 Q. And would you have personally been the one to  
 10 make the frequency change on the radio?  
 11 A. I believe it was me because I was responsible  
 12 for the radio communication.  
 13 Q. And that would have been the left VHF?  
 14 A. Ordinarily we use the left VHF, so probably it  
 15 was that at that time.  
 16 Q. So isn't it fair to say, Mr. Yamaguchi, that  
 17 once you changed frequency after being cleared to  
 18 spot 10, up until the point of the impact, there was no  
 19 way for United ramp control to contact you or for you to  
 20 contact them at that point?  
 21 A. In a way it is correct. We were told and  
 22 instructed by the ramp control to taxi it to spot 10 and  
 23 to contact ground, and then we changed the frequency in  
 24 this case this have a good day right here, means contact  
 25 ground.

Page 114

1 control. They said, have a good day. It means change  
 2 the frequency.

3 MR. TORPEY: Q. Again move to strike,  
 4 Mr. Yamaguchi. One last time:  
 5 You, after you were cleared to spot 10 by ramp  
 6 control, you were no longer listening to nor making  
 7 attempts to contact United ramp control prior to the  
 8 impact. Is that a true statement, sir?

9 MR. TURNER: Objection as to form and  
 10 foundation.

11 THE WITNESS: Naturally we cannot hear the  
 12 instruction from the ramp control, but if necessary, we  
 13 could change the frequency from the ground control  
 14 frequency to the ramp control frequency once again. But  
 15 in this case, it was not necessary to do so.

16 MR. TORPEY: Q. Now, in changing frequencies  
 17 from the ramp control to the ground control, you did  
 18 that prior to reaching spot 10; correct?

19 A. Yes.

20 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Sorry. I need to change  
 21 tape.

22 MR. TURNER: Let's also take a break. We have  
 23 been going for over an hour and 15 minutes.

24 MR. TORPEY: No problem.

25 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: This concludes Videotape 3

Page 116

1 Q. Mr. Yamaguchi, prior to the impact and after  
 2 being cleared to spot 10, you switched the frequency on  
 3 your radio and accordingly there was no way from that  
 4 point to the impact for United ramp control to call you  
 5 or for you to call them. Is that a true statement, sir?

6 A. No. I don't think so. Right here at  
 7 11:55:34 –

8 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter will  
 9 restate.

10 THE WITNESS: Right here at 11:55:28 it says,  
 11 you are cleared to spot 10, please. So they are telling  
 12 us that there is no obstacle to us up to spot 10.

13 MR. TORPEY: Q. Again move to strike. That's  
 14 not the question, Mr. Yamaguchi. The question had  
 15 nothing to do about what you interpreted it. The  
 16 question has to do with whether, after you switched  
 17 frequencies so you're no longer talking to the ramp  
 18 control, you're talking to ground, from that point to  
 19 the impact there was no way for United ramp control to  
 20 contact you or you to contact them. Is that true or is  
 21 that false?

22 MR. TURNER: Objection as to form and  
 23 foundation.

24 THE WITNESS: At this point it was no longer  
 25 necessary to monitor the frequency related to the ramp

1 in the deposition of Eishin Yamaguchi. The time on the  
 2 monitor is 5:02.

3 (Recess taken.)

4 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Here begins Videotape 4 in  
 5 the deposition of Eishin Yamaguchi. Coming back on the  
 6 record. The time on the monitor is 5:17. Please begin.

7 MR. TORPEY: Q. Mr. Yamaguchi, you indicated  
 8 that the statements that I read to you earlier in  
 9 Exhibits 3 and 4 to the effect that you're supposed to  
 10 stop at spot 10 prior to contacting ground that there  
 11 was a similar instruction in your route or route manual;  
 12 correct?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And that was true on October 7 of 2003;  
 15 correct?

16 A. Well, the manual has been revised since then,  
 17 but I believe that the content would be the same.

18 Q. Okay. Now, are the route manual policies,  
 19 including that one, considered company policies of ANA  
 20 which you and all company pilots are required to follow?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And switching frequencies and contacting ATC  
 23 ground before you got to spot 10, you violated the  
 24 company policy on October 7, 2003; correct?

25 A. No, that is not so.

Page 115

Page 117

30 (Pages 114 to 117)

## Eishin Yamaguchi

1 Q. Why is that not so?  
 2 A. Exhibit 3, second paragraph under procedures  
 3 says, unless otherwise directed. And we were otherwise  
 4 directed. They said have a good day, which means you  
 5 may now change frequency.

6 Q. Where is it written that have a good day means  
 7 that you can violate your company's policy against  
 8 switching frequencies before you get to spot 10?

9 MR. TURNER: Objection as to form and  
 10 foundation and a misstatement of this witness's prior  
 11 testimony.

12 THE WITNESS: Between a pilot and a  
 13 controller, the intent of the phrase have a good day  
 14 means good-bye, so you can now change to a different  
 15 frequency. If that had not been the intent, then they  
 16 would have said to us, remain that frequency.

17 MR. TORPEY: Q. Well, Mr. Yamaguchi, the fact  
 18 that there was no longer any need for the ramp  
 19 controller to talk to you further because they've  
 20 already cleared you to spot 10, that does not mean that  
 21 the ramp controller authorized you to stop monitoring  
 22 that frequency before you got to spot 10; correct?

23 MR. TURNER: Objection as to form and  
 24 foundation, misstatement of this witness's testimony and  
 25 you're just trying to argue with the witness.

Page 118

1 command, 155 people on your airplane, you're taxiing  
 2 with the right wing tip you cannot see out the window.  
 3 Do you think, Mr. Yamaguchi, that for the  
 4 safety of your passengers it would have been a good idea  
 5 for you to contact ramp control once you saw the United  
 6 aircraft and asked ramp control whether or not your  
 7 aircraft was going to clear that United aircraft?

8 MR. TURNER: Objection as to form and  
 9 foundation.

10 THE WITNESS: In this situation we did not do  
 11 that because it was not necessary.

12 MR. TORPEY: Q. You believed it was not  
 13 necessary because you were a hundred percent certain  
 14 that you were not going to hit that aircraft, the United  
 15 aircraft; correct?

16 MR. TURNER: Objection as to form and  
 17 foundation.

18 THE WITNESS: Yes.

19 MR. TORPEY: Q. What if you were not a  
 20 hundred percent certain? What if you were something  
 21 less than a hundred percent certain? Do you believe in  
 22 that situation, believe that for the safety of the 155  
 23 people on your aircraft that you as the pilot in  
 24 command, as the communicating pilot should have  
 25 attempted to contact United ramp control to determine if

Page 120

1 THE WITNESS: No. I do not think so. If it  
 2 had been necessary to maintain the frequency and monitor  
 3 the frequency with the ramp control, they would have  
 4 said, clear to spot 10, and then contact ramp  
 5 control -- they would have said.

6 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter will  
 7 restate.

8 THE WITNESS: If it had been necessary to  
 9 continue to monitor the ramp tower frequency, they would  
 10 have stated the clearance in this manner, quote, you are  
 11 cleared to spot 10. Contact ground at spot 10.

12 MR. TORPEY: Q. Mr. Yamaguchi, do you believe  
 13 that there's any safety hazard to the 155 people on your  
 14 airplane whose lives you're responsible for by virtue of  
 15 the fact that you switched frequencies and are no longer  
 16 talking to ramp control which is the controller that is  
 17 monitoring the nonmovement area?

18 Do you think that that's dangerous that you've  
 19 switched that frequency when you're still in the  
 20 nonmovement area and can no longer hear or talk to the  
 21 ramp control?

22 MR. TURNER: Objection as to form and  
 23 foundation.

24 THE WITNESS: No, I do not.

25 MR. TORPEY: Q. Now, you're the pilot in

Page 119

1 your aircraft was going to clear with other aircraft?  
 2 A. My answer will be the same. In that situation  
 3 we judged that we had a 100 percent understanding that  
 4 there was clearance, therefore, we continued to taxi and  
 5 stayed at the ground frequency.

6 Q. Again I'll move to strike, Mr. Yamaguchi.  
 7 That's totally unresponsive to my question. So as with  
 8 my other questions, I'm going to ask the court to look  
 9 at it, and I'll move on. I can't obviously ask you  
 10 anything else about that at the moment, so I'm going to  
 11 turn to another topic.

12 On the day of the accident, Mr. Yamaguchi, as  
 13 the pilot in control and with 155 people in your  
 14 aircraft whose safety you're responsible for, if you  
 15 wanted to stop the taxi and call ramp control, you had  
 16 the ability to do that; correct?

17 MR. TURNER: Objection as to form and  
 18 foundation.

19 THE WITNESS: I had the ability, but I did not  
 20 believe that there was a necessity.

21 MR. TORPEY: Q. And had you stopped and  
 22 contacted ramp control to inquire whether your aircraft  
 23 could safely pass by the United aircraft, what would you  
 24 have had to have done in order to do that?

25 MR. TURNER: Objection as to form and

Page 121

31 (Pages 118 to 121)

## Eishin Yamaguchi

1 foundation.  
 2 THE WITNESS: I don't understand. Could I  
 3 have the question again.  
 4 MR. TORPEY: Read it back.  
 5 (Record read by the reporter.)  
 6 MR. TURNER: Same objection.  
 7 THE WITNESS: We felt that there was no need  
 8 to take any action other than those that we took.  
 9 MR. TORPEY: Move to strike. Not responsive.  
 10 Q. I didn't ask you, Mr. Yamaguchi, whether you  
 11 felt it necessary. I asked you — you're an intelligent  
 12 man. I asked you specifically if you had chosen, not  
 13 whether you should have, but if you had chosen to stop  
 14 your aircraft and contact ramp control prior to  
 15 proceeding and colliding into the United aircraft, what  
 16 is it that you would have had to have done to do that?  
 17 MR. TURNER: Objection as to form and  
 18 foundation as well as to counsel's snide comments.  
 19 THE WITNESS: My answer is not about this  
 20 case, but in general terms. If there is a judgment that  
 21 there is a danger, then we would stop the aircraft.  
 22 Q. Again move to strike. Final time,  
 23 Mr. Yamaguchi.  
 24 In order to stop the aircraft, what physically  
 25 has to be done? If you're taxiing on October 7, 2003,

Page 122

1 let's say, halfway between the engine-start line and the  
 2 impact on October 7, 2003, you decided that you wanted  
 3 to stop the aircraft, change the frequency back, and  
 4 contact ramp control to determine if you had clearance  
 5 to get past the United aircraft, would you agree with  
 6 me, sir, you could have done that, you could have  
 7 accomplished that within a minute or less?  
 8 MR. TURNER: Objection as to form and  
 9 foundation and incomplete hypothetical.  
 10 THE WITNESS: I cannot answer as to  
 11 specifically how many seconds or minutes it takes to  
 12 make the judgment. Rather I do not know.  
 13 MR. TORPEY: Q. How long does it take to  
 14 switch the frequency on your VHF radio?  
 15 A. I think that could be done in a second.  
 16 Q. And if you look at Exhibit 2, which is your  
 17 own company operations manual, page 2, why don't you  
 18 take a look at that, Mr. Yamaguchi, Exhibit 2.  
 19 If you look under taxiing at subpart 2, you  
 20 are required to be observant of all obstacles around you  
 21 and taxiing speed is such that you may bring the  
 22 airplane to an immediate and complete stop.  
 23 You see that? You see that, sir?  
 24 A. It is so written here, but I do not know if  
 25 the Japanese manual that I have is identical to the

Page 124

1 and you decided as the pilot in command to stop the taxi  
 2 and then contact ramp control, to stop the airplane,  
 3 physically, what do you do?  
 4 MR. TURNER: Objection as to form and  
 5 foundation.  
 6 THE WITNESS: In order to stop the aircraft,  
 7 it is necessary to apply the brakes.  
 8 MR. TORPEY: Q. Okay. And how long would it  
 9 take to apply the brakes and stop the aircraft if you  
 10 had chosen to do that on October 7, 2003?  
 11 A. One cannot say categorically. There are  
 12 various cases.  
 13 Q. On the date and time you were taxiing on  
 14 October 7, 2003, from the engine-start line to the point  
 15 of impact, if prior to impact you decided to hit the  
 16 brake and stop, how long would it take for you to do  
 17 that?  
 18 MR. TURNER: Objection as to form and  
 19 foundation and incomplete hypothetical.  
 20 THE WITNESS: I would not know the exact  
 21 amount of time.  
 22 MR. TORPEY: Q. Well, it only takes a few  
 23 seconds to touch the brake pedal; correct?  
 24 A. If it's just touching, yes.  
 25 Q. Well, let me ask you this: Mr. Yamaguchi, if,

Page 123

1 English manual here.  
 2 Q. Well, let's assume that it is identical for  
 3 purposes of this question and all of my questions on  
 4 this. Okay? You understand that Mr. Yamaguchi?  
 5 A. But would that not be disadvantageous for me?  
 6 If the two manuals were different and I give my answer  
 7 based on the English version and say that that is the  
 8 ANA operation, that would be a disadvantage to me.  
 9 Q. Well, Mr. Yamaguchi, I'm not going to comment  
 10 on what's an advantage and disadvantage. I'm here to  
 11 ask you questions under oath. Your counsel produced  
 12 what he produced. Now all I can do is ask you questions  
 13 with regard to what he produced to me not with what he  
 14 didn't produce to me. That's for another day and time.  
 15 I'm going to ask you to assume that the  
 16 operations manual that you have in Japanese is exactly  
 17 the same as the one your counsel produced to us in  
 18 English, which we've now marked as Exhibit 2.  
 19 Do you understand me so far, Mr. Yamaguchi?  
 20 MR. TURNER: And I will instruct the witness  
 21 that he can make that assumption for the purpose of  
 22 Mr. Torpey's next question that the text of the manual  
 23 in the first two pages of Exhibit 2 is the same as his  
 24 manual for the same subjects in his Japanese operations  
 25 manual. He can make that assumption. Okay?

Page 125

32 (Pages 122 to 125)

## Eishin Yamaguchi

1 MR. TORPEY: Q. That being the case,  
 2 Mr. Yamaguchi, since your company policy in the  
 3 operations manual is that you're required to taxi at a  
 4 speed such that you can bring your aircraft to an  
 5 immediate stop, would you agree with me, sir, that if on  
 6 October 7, 2003, you chose as pilot in command for the  
 7 safety of the 155 people on your aircraft to stop the  
 8 taxi and contact United ramp, you could have done that  
 9 in less than 1 minute?

10 MR. TURNER: Objection as to form and  
 11 foundation and an incomplete hypothetical.

12 THE WITNESS: I did not have that thought  
 13 because I did not feel the necessity.

14 MR. TORPEY: Q. Again, I'll move to strike.  
 15 That's completely unresponsive, and I'm going to move on  
 16 to another area since you will not respond to my  
 17 questions in this regard.

18 Mr. Yamaguchi, is it true that the first time  
 19 you saw the United aircraft was when it began pushing  
 20 back from its gate? Is that the first point of contact  
 21 that you saw the United aircraft, when it initiated its  
 22 push back?

23 MR. TURNER: Objection as to form.

24 THE WITNESS: I do not have a clear  
 25 recollection.

Page 126

1 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter will  
 2 restate.

3 THE WITNESS: I do not have an accurate  
 4 recollection.

5 MR. TORPEY: Q. So you don't recall at this  
 6 point whether the United aircraft had or had not started  
 7 its pushback from the gate at the time that you  
 8 initially saw it; correct?

9 A. Yes.

10 MR. TORPEY: Okay. Let's mark this.  
 11 (Whereupon, Exhibit 7 was marked for  
 12 identification.)

13 MR. TORPEY: Q. Let me show you what's marked  
 14 Exhibit 7. Do you recognize that document, sir?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Now, if you look under the section that says  
 17 started taxi and you look down to the third line, it  
 18 says approaching spot 10, I recognized UALB77 has  
 19 started pushout from gate 102. Do you see that?

20 So reviewing that, does that refresh your  
 21 recollection that you first saw the United aircraft when  
 22 it initiated or started its pushback from the gate?

23 MR. TURNER: Objection as to form and  
 24 foundation and a total misstatement of what you just  
 25 read.

Page 127

1 MR. TORPEY: That's not a -- go ahead.  
 2 THE WITNESS: Upon reading this sentence, that  
 3 is the case.

4 MR. TORPEY: Q. Okay. So your first -- and  
 5 you were in the left-hand seat; correct?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And when you first saw United start to push  
 8 back, did you say anything at that point to anybody else  
 9 in the cockpit of your aircraft?

10 A. We may have conversed, but I do not recall  
 11 what we said.

12 Q. Okay. In the cockpit there's an area  
 13 microphone; correct?

14 A. Are you talking about the cockpit voice  
 15 recorder.

16 Q. There are microphones that are connected, if  
 17 you will, to the cockpit voice recorder so that whatever  
 18 is spoken in the cockpit of your aircraft can be  
 19 recorded by the cockpit voice recorder; correct?

20 A. I don't know if there is a microphone, but the  
 21 conversation in the cockpit is recorded.

22 Q. Okay. Mr. Yamaguchi, you indicated you saw  
 23 the United aircraft start to push. At some point did  
 24 you see the United aircraft stop its pushback?

25 A. I recall that it was a very slow speed, a

Page 128

1 stopping speed.

2 Q. So does that mean that you did witness the  
 3 point at which the United aircraft stopped its push?

4 A. No. That's not the case.

5 Q. At some point did you note -- well, let me ask  
 6 you this.

7 While the United aircraft was being pushed, in  
 8 other words, after the start of the push that you  
 9 indicated you saw, during the push, did you watch the  
 10 United aircraft?

11 A. I was watching what I could see from the  
 12 cockpit.

13 Q. So from your position in the cockpit, you  
 14 could see the pushback of the United aircraft; correct?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And could your flying pilot also see that? Do  
 17 you know?

18 A. Naturally I think he could.

19 Q. And how about the observer pilot?

20 A. I think he could see if he had tried, but I  
 21 don't know.

22 Q. Fair enough. At some point did you observe  
 23 that the United aircraft had stopped pushing back?

24 A. You're inquiring if it stopped. I didn't see  
 25 it stop. Before that, I could no longer see it.

Page 129

33 (Pages 126 to 129)

## Eishin Yamaguchi

1 Q. Well, are you saying that you continually  
2 watched the United aircraft — strike that.

3 Are you saying there came a point in time when  
4 you were no longer able to see any portion of the United  
5 aircraft because you had continued to taxi to a point  
6 that you could no longer see it? Is that what you're  
7 saying?

8 MR. TURNER: Objection as to form.

9 THE WITNESS: No. That's not what I'm saying.  
10 While I could see the United aircraft, I judged the  
11 relative positions of our aircraft and the United  
12 aircraft. That is why we continued to taxi.

13 MR. TORPEY: Q. Mr. Yamaguchi, from the time  
14 you first saw the United aircraft start to push until  
15 the impact, is it your testimony that you at all times  
16 had in your field of view some portion of the United  
17 aircraft?

18 MR. TURNER: Objection as to form and  
19 foundation.

20 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter will repeat  
21 the question in Japanese.

22 THE WITNESS: No. That is not so. The United  
23 aircraft was no longer in my view before the impact for  
24 some time, although I don't know how many seconds that  
25 was.

Page 130

1 this witness in 15 minutes. I can occupy the next 15  
2 minutes to ask more questions, but there's no way I'll  
3 finish this deposition in 15 minutes.

4 MR. TURNER: Are you willing to go — right  
5 now, it's 6:05. Are you willing to go to 6:15? Are you  
6 okay?

7 THE WITNESS (WITHOUT INTERPRETER): Yes.

8 MR. TURNER: Okay. Go for another 10 minutes,  
9 and this deposition is then over.

10 MR. TORPEY: Well, we'll ask the court to rule  
11 on that. I think it's up to her and not you.

12 MR. TURNER: It's up to you. You don't have  
13 to ask the same questions ten times.

14 MR. TORPEY: Q. Mr. Yamaguchi, take a look at  
15 your statement, Exhibit 7, and you say here that the  
16 pilot flying maneuvered slightly to the left side of the  
17 center line. It looked to me that the maneuver was to  
18 increase the margin of clearance from United B777.

19 Do you see that?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Did you understand that there was a potential  
22 conflict or a potential collision hazard and that was  
23 the reason why the turn to the left was initiated?

24 MR. TURNER: Objection as to form and  
25 foundation and a misstatement of what you just read from

Page 132

1 MR. TURNER: Just want to point out,  
2 Mr. Torpey, it is now after 6:00 p.m. We started this  
3 deposition at 10:00 a.m. We had just under an hour for  
4 lunch. The deposition has therefore been in progress  
5 for in excess of seven hours. How much time do you  
6 expect to continue this evening with this witness?

7 MR. TORPEY: Well, will you produce him again  
8 in the morning?

9 MR. TURNER: No. No. He's schedule to go  
10 back tomorrow, and there is another witness scheduled to  
11 begin tomorrow. As a matter of fact, you had said to me  
12 when we were planning that you may not even need a whole  
13 day for the witness.

14 MR. TORPEY: Well, once again, Mr. Turner, I  
15 don't know what you're referring to, but we have  
16 additional questions. I'm not done with this witness,  
17 and I intended to continue as long as we have to and if  
18 need be tomorrow or some other day.

19 I'm not near finishing, and obviously there  
20 are issues with regard to document production that we'll  
21 take up with the court, but I have a number of other  
22 questions to ask this witness.

23 MR. TURNER: Can you finish with this witness  
24 in another 15 minutes if he's willing to stay?

25 MR. TORPEY: Certainly I cannot finish with

Page 131

1 Exhibit 7.

2 MR. TORPEY: And that's a speaking objection.  
3 THE WITNESS: I do not know if the pilot  
4 flying judged whether or not there was a potential  
5 collision hazard at this point.

6 MR. TORPEY: Q. Well, Mr. Yamaguchi, your  
7 statement says that it looked to you that that maneuver  
8 was to increase the margin of clearance from UAL777.  
9 That's your statement, correct, sir?

10 A. This present question is about me, but the  
11 question previous to this one was about pilot flying.  
12 Therefore I said that I cannot tell what the pilot  
13 flying thought.

14 Q. Mr. Yamaguchi, I move to strike that.  
15 I asked you a specific question. I'm not  
16 asking about the question before that. I'll ask it one  
17 more time.

18 That is your statement that it looked to you,  
19 Mr. Yamaguchi, that the maneuver was to increase the  
20 margin of clearance. That's your statement.

21 My question to you, sir, is did you understand  
22 in your mind as the pilot in command that day that the  
23 reason your flying pilot turned to the left was because  
24 there was a perceived collision hazard so he wanted to  
25 increase the clearance or distance between the two

Page 133

## Eishin Yamaguchi

1 aircrafts.  
 2 Was that your thought in your mind when you  
 3 made that statement?  
 4 MR. TURNER: Objection as to form and  
 5 foundation, and you're simply arguing, arguing with the  
 6 witness. You're not asking him questions here. As a  
 7 matter of fact -- well, I said we'd go to 6:15. I'll  
 8 allow this nonsense to continue for another 6 minutes.  
 9 THE WITNESS: Yes.  
 10 MR. TORPEY: Q. And on the next line of your  
 11 statement you say you asked the pilot flying whether the  
 12 clearance was inadequate -- or adequate. Do you see  
 13 that? Let me withdraw it, and I'll restate it.  
 14 Your statement says that you asked your pilot  
 15 flying whether the clearance was adequate. Isn't it  
 16 true, sir, that the reason you asked that question is  
 17 that you as the pilot in command perceived a potential  
 18 conflict or collision hazard with the United aircraft.  
 19 MR. TURNER: Objection as to form and  
 20 foundation.  
 21 THE WITNESS: I recall that it was not because  
 22 of a potential for collision but rather because I  
 23 thought that the clearance was closer than usually.  
 24 MR. TORPEY: Q. Whether it was closer than  
 25 usual or not is irrelevant unless there's a collision

Page 134

1 pilot about the clearance between your aircraft and the  
 2 United aircraft. Is that a true statement, sir?  
 3 MR. TURNER: Objection as to form and  
 4 foundation. Objection as to form and foundation.  
 5 THE WITNESS: I do not recall that I perceived  
 6 any potential conflict.  
 7 MR. TURNER: It's now more than past 6:15.  
 8 This deposition has been going for 8 hours and  
 9 15 minutes with a one-hour break for lunch. This  
 10 deposition is now over.  
 11 MR. TORPEY: Well, for the record, it's not  
 12 over, and we don't even have seven hours of testimony,  
 13 Mr. Turner. So I want it to be clear that we are not  
 14 only going to move that this deposition continue but the  
 15 cost of having to come back here. So if you want to  
 16 terminate this deposition, you do so at your own risk.  
 17 I've got my client here. Jeff Worthe is here.  
 18 You made us come up from Los Angeles needlessly. We're  
 19 going to have to come back here. And if you want to  
 20 terminate this deposition at this point with less than  
 21 seven hours of deposition testimony.  
 22 And, Mr. Reporter, how much time has actually  
 23 been used with testimony.  
 24 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: 6 hours and 34 minutes on  
 25 the record.

Page 136

1 hazard; correct?  
 2 MR. TURNER: Objection as to form and  
 3 foundation.  
 4 THE INTERPRETER: The question. Can you read  
 5 the question again.  
 6 THE WITNESS: No, that's not so.  
 7 MR. TORPEY: Q. So even if there's no  
 8 collision hazard and in this case you believe there was  
 9 none, but you still were interested in knowing what the  
 10 clearance was. Is that what you're telling this jury?  
 11 A. Wanted to know.  
 12 Q. Mr. Yamaguchi it's very simple. In all  
 13 honesty, if you had not perceived the collision hazard,  
 14 you would not have inquired of the pilot flying whether  
 15 or not there was clearance; isn't that true?  
 16 MR. TURNER: Objection as to form and  
 17 foundation and I object that you're just arguing with  
 18 the witness.  
 19 THE WITNESS: It was not imminent like a  
 20 potential for a collision.  
 21 MR. TORPEY: Again I'll move to strike.  
 22 Q. The question, Mr. Yamaguchi, was not timing or  
 23 the imminent nature. The question is you must have  
 24 perceived a potential conflict, potential, or you would  
 25 not as the pilot in command have inquired to your flying

Page 135

1 MR. TURNER: This deposition is over.  
 2 MR. TORPEY: We'll take it up with the court.  
 3 MR. TURNER: All you're doing is arguing with  
 4 the witness.  
 5 MR. TORPEY: Are you moving for a protective  
 6 order?  
 7 MR. TURNER: The deposition is over.  
 8 MR. TORPEY: Is it over because you're moving  
 9 for a protective order? I'll take that as a no. That  
 10 you're just terminating the deposition with no basis.  
 11 So if that is the case, we'll take it up with the court.  
 12 MR. TURNER: The deposition is over because  
 13 we've exceeded the seven hours. You've wasted hours  
 14 just asking the same questions over and over again and  
 15 arguing with the witness. Deposition is over.  
 16 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Shall I go off the record?  
 17 MR. TURNER: It's not over. If you're going  
 18 to represent that you're going to finish with this  
 19 witness in the next 30 minutes, I'll permit him to stay,  
 20 but you've refused to do this.  
 21 Can you finish with the witness in the next  
 22 30 minutes?  
 23 MR. TORPEY: I've already made my position  
 24 clear, Mr. Turner, and if you're -- I'll ask 30 more  
 25 minutes of questions, but I won't be done in 30 minutes.

Page 137

35 (Pages 134 to 137)

## Eishin Yamaguchi

1 So if you're terminating it, I'm prepared to continue.  
 2 I'm prepared to continue for an hour. I'm prepared to  
 3 come back tomorrow morning. I'm prepared to come —  
 4       THE WITNESS: This witness is on a totally  
 5 different time schedule from you and all you're doing is  
 6 abusing the witness when he's been entirely helpful and  
 7 courteous to you. You've been entirely discourteous to  
 8 him. This deposition is over.

9       THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Shall we go off the record?

10      MR. TORPEY: Apparently, since he's leaving,  
 11 we're, I guess, going to be done.

12      (Whereupon, the deposition adjourned at  
 13 6:17 p.m.)

14      —oOo—

15      I declare under penalty of perjury that the  
 16 foregoing is true and correct. Subscribed at  
 17 \_\_\_\_\_, California, this \_\_\_\_ day  
 18 of \_\_\_\_\_, 2007.

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22                   EISHIN YAMAGUCHI

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Page 138

1                   CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

2      I, BRANDON D. COMBS, a Certified Shorthand  
 3 Reporter, hereby certify that the witness in the  
 4 foregoing deposition was by me duly sworn to tell the  
 5 truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth in the  
 6 within-entitled cause;

7      That said deposition was taken in shorthand by  
 8 me, a disinterested person, at the time and place  
 9 therein stated, and that the testimony of the said  
 10 witness was thereafter reduced to typewriting, by  
 11 computer, under my direction and supervision;

12      That before completion of the deposition,  
 13 review of the transcript was not requested. If  
 14 requested, any changes made by the deponent (and  
 15 provided to the reporter) during the period allowed are  
 16 appended hereto.

17      I further certify that I am not of counsel or  
 18 attorney for either or any of the parties to the said  
 19 deposition, nor in any way interested in the event of  
 20 this cause, and that I am not related to any of the  
 21 parties thereto.

22      DATED: November 29, 2007.

23

24

25

                 BRANDON D. COMBS, CSR 1297

Page 139

36 (Pages 138 to 139)